



**Research Product 2007-03**

**Army Excellence in Leadership (AXL):  
Educating Army Leaders with the Tripwire Film**

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U.S. Army Research Institute

**20070420401**

**March 2007**

**Leader Development Research Unit**

**United States Army Research Institute  
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**

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## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy) March 2007		2. REPORT TYPE Interim		3. DATES COVERED (from... to) October 2005 – December 2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Army Excellence in Leadership (AXL): Educating Army Leaders with the Tripwire Film				5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER	
				5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 633007	
6. AUTHOR(S):  Kimberly A. Metcalf and Michelle L. Zbylut (U.S. Army Research Institute)				5c. PROJECT NUMBER A792	
				5d. TASK NUMBER 285	
				5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences ATTN: DAPE-ARI-RK 851 McClellan Ave., Building 90 Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1360				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 2511 Jefferson Davis Highway Arlington, VA 22202-3926				10. MONITOR ACRONYM ARI	
				11. MONITOR REPORT NUMBER Research Product 2007-03	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Subject Matter POC: Kimberly A. Metcalf					
14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):  This research product contains an instructor's manual which describes how to use the <i>Tripwire</i> case study from the Army Excellence in Leadership (AXL) system within a traditional classroom setting. The manual is intended to help instructors prepare for classroom discussions of leadership challenges and issues embedded within the <i>Tripwire</i> scenario. Because the <i>Tripwire</i> scenario is built around junior leadership issues in Iraq, instructors may find the <i>Tripwire</i> lessons particularly relevant for junior officers who will deploy to the Middle East. However, instructors can tailor <i>Tripwire</i> lessons to suit a broader training audience. The manual contains a summary and hard copy of the <i>Tripwire</i> case study, a description of potential teaching objectives and related discussion questions, and guidance on how to facilitate an effective classroom discussion. An overview of the AXL.net system, technical requirements, and contact information for obtaining the case study is also provided.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Leadership, TLAC-XL, AXL, Case Study Method, Discussion, Training, Education, Interpersonal Skills, Cultural Awareness, Iraq					
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF			19. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  Unlimited	20. NUMBER OF PAGES  92	21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON Ellen Kinzer Technical Publication Specialist 703-602-8047
16. REPORT Unclassified	17. ABSTRACT Unclassified	18. THIS PAGE Unclassified			



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**March 2007**

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**Army Project Number**  
**633007A792**

**Personnel Performance**  
**and Training**

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The Army Excellence in Leadership (AXL) project is a collaborative research effort between the United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) and the University of Southern California's Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT). The authors would like to thank several members of the ICT project team for the many hours they have devoted to the AXL project—Julia Kim, Randy Hill, Scott Rocher, Salvo Lavis, Andrew Gordon, Sudeep Gandhe, and David Traum. Additionally, ICT played a critical role in the development of the *Tripwire* film, which was written and produced by Kim LeMasters.

The Behavioral Sciences and Leadership Department at the United States Military Academy (USMA) also has been a great source of support for this project, particularly COL Tom Kolditz, COL Donna Brazil, Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel, LTC Sean Hannah, and the captains in the Tactical Officer's Education Program (TOEP). Many of the ideas embedded in the *Tripwire* film stem from interviews with Captains from USMA.

The authors would like to thank Stanley Halpin and Robert Solick of ARI for their continual support throughout the duration of this project, which would not be possible without them. The authors also acknowledge the support provided by Jeffrey Wilkinson of the Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM).

# ARMY EXCELLENCE IN LEADERSHIP (AXL): EDUCATING ARMY LEADERS WITH THE TRIPWIRE FILM

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# Overview

## Overview

*Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are telling us that wars are won by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions, all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their cultures, and their motivation.*

Major General Robert H. Scales (Ret.)

The contemporary operating environment for the Army is changing and as reflected in the quote above, peacekeeping now goes hand-in-hand with war fighting (Yingling & Nagl, 2003). In addition, essential leadership tasks such as building trust, negotiation and conflict resolution are being asked of the Army's junior officers (Brown, 2003). Often, however, there is not enough time for Soldiers to develop these skills based solely on their own experience. Case method instruction provides a safe environment to practice these required decision making, problem solving, and leadership skills.

Unlike traditional schooling methods, case studies have been used to help students discover the underlying *principles* of a field of study. Generally, a case is a written account of an actual event or a simulation of a real-life problem. Facilitated group discussion of the case helps to foster critical thinking and decision making by having students come up with and evaluate potential solutions and conclusions to the problem (McDade, 1995). By presenting students with examples of real life situations, students are provided with experiences and knowledge that may take years to accumulate (Rippin, Booth, Bowie, & Jordan, 2002). Additionally, case method instruction helps students to implement theory in real world contexts (Jennings, 1996). Recently, cases have evolved from written accounts into simulations, role-play exercises, and videos (Rippin et al., 2002). The Army Research Institute (ARI), in conjunction with the Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT), is investigating the benefits of film-based cases as an approach to Army leadership development. The first filmed case in the series, *Power Hungry*, is described in Zbylut and Ward (2004). This instructor's guide describes one approach for utilizing a second film, *Tripwire*, for conducting case method instruction with junior Army officers (e.g., first and second lieutenants and captains).

*Tripwire* is a 15-minute film depicting the events surrounding the transfer of authority of an Iraqi village from a Marine Company to an Army Battery. Following the transfer, the Battery is tasked with maintaining the stability of the village while providing immediate security for a meeting between an Iraqi cabinet member and the local Imam. In addition, the Captain (CPT) and his Soldiers are confronted with a series of obstacles including potential improvised explosive device (IED) threats, casualties, and leadership issues (e.g., balancing mission and troops, communication, cultural awareness etc.). The original *Tripwire* script was developed from interviews with Captains who had recently returned from deployments (R. Hill, Douglas, Gordon, Pighin, & van Velsen, 2003; R.

Hill, Gordon & Kim, 2004; Gordon, 2005) and was subsequently reviewed and edited by subject matter experts (e.g., military leadership experts, IED experts). Department of Army personnel also were on location during filming to ensure military accuracy. As a result of using realistic events and professional actors, the film accurately portrays a gritty realism salient to Soldiers.

While this manual provides guidance on using *Tripwire* in a facilitated group discussion, it should be noted that the film is also embedded in a larger, web-based instructional tool called AXL.net. AXL.net is an interactive online system that was developed by ICT in collaboration with ARI. AXL.net houses two filmed case studies, *Power Hungry* and *Tripwire*. Both films are highly relevant to the current operating environments encountered in the Middle East. *Power Hungry* focuses on a food distribution operation in Afghanistan, while *Tripwire* focuses on activities within an Iraqi town. Each film is paired with several interactive modules focusing on a variety of leadership topics (e.g., communication, cultural awareness, employing the expertise of non-commissioned officers, etc.). In each module, students are presented with a short description of the lessons to be learned from the module and are provided with an opportunity to watch the film. Following the film, students are presented with a series of multiple-choice and open-ended questions that students respond to by typing their answers into the computer. Students also are able to interact with characters from the film. Students can “interview” characters at any point during the module by typing questions to a character (e.g., *CPT Holston, why did you not solicit input from your officers?*). The character interview feature allows students to access additional information not included in the film and helps students to achieve a better understanding and insight into the thoughts and feelings of the characters. AXL.net’s iterative approach of questioning and being questioned encourages students to be active participants in the learning process as they explore the principles and objectives embedded in the module. Currently, content is available for several leadership and cultural awareness modules for both *Power Hungry* and *Tripwire*; however, instructors also will have the option to create and author new educational content for their own chosen teaching objectives.

As stated earlier, this manual is intended to provide guidance in using *Tripwire* in a facilitated discussion setting. The intended target student audience is junior Army officers, and it is recommended that instructors allocate 60 to 90 minutes to show and discuss the film. To help instructors facilitate discussion, the instruction manual is divided into four informational sections:

- Instructions on how to play *Tripwire*.
- A general analysis of the *Tripwire* scenario.
- A review of the teaching objectives embedded in *Tripwire*.
- Tips for leading and facilitating a group discussion.

Potentially useful information is also contained in the Appendices. Appendix A contains a series of questions related to the *Tripwire* teaching objectives that instructors can use while facilitating group discussions. Appendix B contains a written version of the *Tripwire* story which instructors may find helpful in preparing for discussion. Lastly, Appendix C provides the character's answers to a variety of questions about the scenario. As mentioned previously, the AXL.net system allows students to interview characters. However, instructors who are using the film without the benefit of the AXL.net system do not have access to the online character interview feature. Thus, instructors who are using the film rather than the AXL.net system in its entirety may want to provide some of this additional character information to students.

**Viewing the *Tripwire* DVD**

## ***Viewing the Tripwire DVD***

### ***Obtaining the Film***

**To receive a copy of the film on DVD, please contact:**

- U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences  
Leader Development Research Unit  
851 McClellan Ave, Building 90  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1360  
(913) 684-9753

### ***System Requirements***

**In order to attain the best DVD viewing experience on your personal computer, your computer or laptop should meet or exceed the following requirements:**

- Microsoft XP / Max OS X 10.3
- 500 MHz CPU
- A DVD-ROM drive
- Graphics card capable of DVD playback
- 4MB or more of video RAM
- 128MB of system RAM
- Sound card, speakers or headphones required for audio
- Windows Media Player or equivalent player capable of playing DVDs. Windows Media player can be obtained at <http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/players.aspx>  
<<http://www.microsoft.com/windows/%20windowsmedia/%20players.aspx>

### *Viewing the DVD*

You will most likely receive the film on a DVD. The DVD was created with an automatic play feature, so the film should automatically open after being placed into your DVD-ROM drive. Once open, you have the choice of playing the film or viewing the trailer.

If, after inserting the DVD into the DVD-ROM drive, the film does not start automatically, complete the following steps:

- Click on **“START.”**
- Click on **“My Computer”** and select the DVD-ROM drive (it should be labeled TRIPWIRE\_DVD).

The default video player used by your personal computer should now be able to open and play the video. Windows Media Player is recommended, but other media players, such as Power DVD can be used.

### *Problems You Might Encounter*

One problem you may encounter while trying to view the film is that you may have audio but no picture or vice versa, a picture but no audio. Additionally, you may receive an error message that the program is searching for “codecs”. Both of the above problems can be fixed by downloading the DivX codec and installing it on your hard drive. The DivX codec can be downloaded at the following website <http://www.divx.com/> .

Due to the length of the film, you may want to disengage your screensaver or set up your screensaver to appear only after a long period of inactivity (e.g., 20 minutes or more). Otherwise, the screensaver may appear and interrupt your viewing of the film. To change the delay on your screensaver, complete the following steps:

- Click on **“START”** then on **“CONTROL PANEL.”**
- Click on **“Appearance and Themes”** and then on **“Choose a screensaver.”**
- Change the **“Wait”** time to 20 minutes or more.

### ***Points of Contact***

If you experience difficulty with the film or have additional questions about how to use *Tripwire* as a case study, please contact any of the following individuals at ARI:

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences  
Leader Development Research Unit  
851 McClellan Ave, Building 90  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1360  
(913) 684-9753



## **General Analysis of the *Tripwire* Scenario**

## *General Analysis of the Tripwire Scenario*

This section of the manual is provided to give an overview of events in the *Tripwire* scenario. It also helps to establish the relationship between the storyline to the teaching objectives found within the case study. It should be noted that due to the realistic and complex nature of the storyline a single event or situation occurring within the film may overlap with several of the teaching themes.

The *Tripwire* film is a case study about the events following a RIPTOA (relief in place, transfer of authority) of Tikuk, Iraq from a Marine Company to an Army battery. The battery's mission, headed by CPT Holston, was to maintain the stability of the Iraqi village and provide security for an upcoming meeting between a visiting Iraqi official and the local Imam. After being briefed by the Marine Captain, CPT Holston believed the town to be "cold and settled" and the population passive.

Several factors present at the start of the film contributed to the complex situation faced by CPT Holston and his Soldiers. Firstly, CPT Holston had only been with the current company for about a month and he found himself leading a group of Soldiers with varying experience. For example, while it was the second tour to Iraq for First Sergeant (1SG) Morino it was only the first deployment into the region for other officers in the unit. Lastly, the imminent but unknown arrival time of the Iraqi official further complicated the situation.



### *Balancing Mission and Troops*

Early in the film, CPT Holston and his Soldiers were presented with a series of challenges that reverberated throughout the scenario. Specifically, CPT Holston was faced with balancing mission accomplishment – maintaining stability and providing security for the Iraqi official- and protecting his Soldiers from the

danger of IEDs. Keeping his Soldiers safe was a top priority for CPT Holston because two of his Soldiers were previously killed by an IED while on route protection. The presence of multiple IED threats in the scenario seemed to distract CPT Holston from conceiving a security plan to protect the Iraqi official.

### *Cultural Awareness*

With the first potential IED threat, CPT Holston was faced with trying to understand and navigate the complexities of Iraqi culture and beliefs. The first potential IED was thought to be contained in a book bag in which the owner, a young Iraqi male, indicated only contained prayer books. Indifferent to the religious importance of the books, CPT Holston ordered his Soldiers to shoot the bag. When a Qur'an is discovered inside, the



local civilians are angered by what they perceive as insensitivity on behalf of the Soldiers. This unfavorable perception of the troops may have been amplified by the Soldiers' course of action taken with the second IED threat. The second potential IED was believed to be underneath a dead animal. However, CPT Holston decided not to shoot, and his inaction may have been viewed more critically by the populace since in their perspective the Soldiers were willing to risk destroying a holy scripture but not a dead animal.

To add an additional layer of cultural and tactical complexity to the *Tripwire* scenario, the Soldiers needed to work with a local interpreter to function effectively in the town. Early in the scenario, the unit's first interpreter is killed. This prompts CPT Holston to tell his ISG to find an interpreter quickly, without going through formal channels. The Soldiers make several mistakes with the new interpreter, Hazem. First, although the Soldiers may have needed to acquire an interpreter quickly in order to interact with the town, this did not preclude them from submitting a formal request for a vetted interpreter. Second, 1LT Porter physically abuses Hazem even though Hazem did nothing to provoke the action. Third, the Soldiers leave Hazem completely unattended for several minutes, during which time Hazem acquired a cell phone from an insurgent. Finally, the Soldiers discuss sensitive mission information in front of Hazem, even though Hazem has not been cleared as a "trusted" interpreter.



#### *Communication*

In addition to challenges in interacting with the local population, the Soldiers demonstrate difficulty in effectively interacting with one another. Several instances of poor communication existed between CPT Holston and his Soldiers. For example, CPT Holston did not solicit the input of any of his officers and disregarded any input voluntarily given by his men. CPT Holston also never provided feedback with respect to input provided by his Soldiers, and simply told the Soldiers how he wanted things to be done. The impact this had on the battery can be clearly seen when they are confronted with the second potential IED. At that time, 1LT Porter offered no advice but pointedly asked CPT Holston, "What do you want us to do, Sir?"

Similarly, the Soldiers failed to effectively communicate with CPT Holston. Both 1LT Porter and ISG Morino should have informed CPT Holston about 1LT Porter's personal problem with his fiancé and the impact those personal issues were having on his

performance. For instance, 1LT Porter's personal problems led him to "tune out" during a briefing and probably contributed to him missing the dead animal carcass on his patrol. Another example in which the Soldiers did a poor job of communicating with CPT Holston was while CPT Holston and the Soldiers were discussing the level of force to use within the town. The Soldiers did not present a strong argument for showing force, and their tone conveyed a certain amount of disrespect toward the captain. Because the Captain's passive approach was largely ineffective in this situation, it was imperative that the Soldiers needed to make a more compelling argument. While it could be debated that CPT Holston would not have accepted his Soldiers' advice under any circumstances, certainly the Soldiers could have more effectively communicated their approach for dealing with the town.

### *Establishing Trust*

Poor communication may have influenced or been a sign of problems of trust between CPT Holston and his Soldiers. One indication the Soldiers did not trust CPT Holston was that 1LT Porter never approached CPT Holston to discuss the personal problem he was experiencing. Furthermore, after CPT Holston explained the course of action they were going to take following their interpreter's death he added, "Look, my methods have worked before and they will work again. *I need you men to trust me on this.*" The apparent need to ask for his men's confidence could be evidence of a lack of trust.

### *Resolving Conflicts*

Members of the battery also experienced a series of intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts throughout the scenario. The most evident is the internal conflict suffered by 1LT Porter after finding out about his girlfriend's pregnancy. 1LT Porter's internal conflict manifested itself in a series of behavioral changes. For example, he appeared to be very distracted and became increasingly aggressive as the scenario continued, to the point at which he strikes Hazem, the replacement interpreter. Lastly, when 1LT Porter confides in 1SG Morino and explains the situation with his girlfriend, 1SG Morino did not take it very seriously and joked that it was better to find out now rather than "...have her spring a Jerry Springer on ya after you're married". This apparent lack of sensitivity caused an angry, interpersonal conflict to develop between the two Soldiers.

### *Taking Care of Soldiers*

Lastly, CPT Holston did not take adequate care of himself and further hindered the battery by allowing himself to become dehydrated and eventually a heat casualty. With the loss of their Captain, 1LT Porter is forced to take a larger leadership role, one that he may not have been prepared to do given his current state of mind. At this same time, 1LT Porter learns the Iraqi official is arriving earlier than expected and there is the possibility of a third IED.



1LT Porter must determine which of these two responsibilities, mission accomplishment or troop safety should take priority. Consistent with CPT Holston's priorities, 1LT Porter investigates the potential IED.

The third IED threat proves to be real, and there is a small explosion when it is detonated. However, 1LT Porter realizes the IED may have been a diversion to draw the troops away from the Iraqi official. 1LT Porter and his men run to the site of the official's arrival to find the official's car being ambushed by a group of insurgents. A gun battle ensues between the two groups. When the battle ends 1LT Porter discovers that the Iraqi official has been killed and the mission has failed.

At the end of the *Tripwire* film, instructors should have their students discuss what events or actions led up to or contributed to the ending of the film. Specifically, students should discuss the effective and ineffective leadership behaviors of CPT Holston and of his Soldiers to determine what impact these behaviors had on the mission. After having completing the discussion, students should have a greater understanding of how leadership behaviors impact the behavior of others.

## **Teaching Objectives for *Tripwire***

## ***Teaching Objectives for Tripwire***

The *Tripwire* storyline was created from actual challenges and situations experienced by Captains during deployment, however an underlying goal for the film's development was to help facilitate a leader's interpersonal tacit knowledge (Sternberg, Forsythe, Hedlund, Horvath, Wagner, Williams, Snook, & Grigorenko, 2000). Based upon interviews with military officers, Sternberg et al (2000) identified critical interpersonal skills needed by junior leaders. To help develop these abilities, the critical interpersonal skills identified by Sternberg et al (2000) were interwoven as underlying themes within the *Tripwire* story and this manual was written to aid instructors in facilitating a classroom discussion of these topics. Therefore, this section of the manual provides discussion topics based on the following seven themes:

- |   |                                      |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| <b><i>1. Balancing Mission and Troops</i></b>           | <b><i>5. Communication</i></b>       |
| <b><i>2. Taking Care of Soldiers</i></b>                | <b><i>6. Resolving Conflicts</i></b> |
| <b><i>3. Directing and Supervising Subordinates</i></b> | <b><i>7. Cultural Awareness</i></b>  |
| <b><i>4. Establishing Trust</i></b>                     |                                      |

While this section of the manual describes the relevance of each of the listed themes in relation to leadership and team issues, due to the complexity of the case instructors may use the *Tripwire* film to address other leadership issues than those listed above. Instructors are further encouraged to develop their own learning objectives to match the educational goals of their particular course.

A description of the objectives or points to be learned from each theme and a page number to find related discussion questions is also provided. The table beginning on page 16 serves as a quick reference of the teaching objectives along with their specific learning points. In addition, on page A-3 of Appendix A is a list of general discussion questions pertaining to leadership.

## ***Quick Reference – Teaching and Learning Objectives for Tripwire***

### ***1. Balancing Mission and Troops***

- Understand the primary mission of the battery.
- Understand how the presence of potential IEDs impacted the primary mission.
- Understand the difficulty of maintaining the balance between mission accomplishment and troop safety
- Understand how an imbalance between mission and welfare or troops may impact leader and follower attitudes, emotions, and behaviors and the leader-follower relationship.

### ***2. Taking Care of Soldiers***

- Identify the behavioral cues a Soldier may demonstrate when experiencing a personal problem.
- Identify ways to assist a Soldier with a personal problem.
- Understand how personal problems affect the individual, as well as the unit and mission accomplishment

### ***3. Directing and Supervising Subordinates***

- Understand how to effectively coordinate a subordinate's activities.
- Understand how to effectively encourage initiative from one's subordinates.

### ***4. Establishing Trust***

- Describe the different types of trust.
- Describe the conditions needed for establishing trust.
- Describe and understand how establishing trust is a reciprocal process.
- Understand the impact trust and mistrust can have on accomplishing a mission.

### ***5. Communication***

- Understand that effective communication involves providing direction and active listening.
- Understand how effective and ineffective communication can affect a mission.
- Understand how body language can communicate thoughts and emotions.

### ***6. Resolving Conflicts***

- Understand and identify the different types of conflicts.
- Understand how conflict can impact the mission.
- Understand and describe the possible causes of conflict.
- Understand the steps one can take to resolve conflict.
- Understand the importance of task and social cohesion to mission accomplishment.
- Understand how to build task and social cohesion.



7. *Cultural Awareness*

- Understand and describe the cultural factors that may affect a mission.
- Understand and describe how cultural factors can impact accomplishing a mission.
- Understand that individuals from foreign countries may also be aware of U.S. culture and beliefs and the impact this may have on mission accomplishment.

## **1. *Balancing Mission and Troops***

The task of accomplishing the mission while ensuring subordinates' welfare is likely to become more difficult as leaders are faced with a wider array of potential threats, increasing enemy capabilities, the use of unconventional warfare methods, and the increased frequency of missions (Leonard, Polich, Peterson, Sortor, & Moore, 2006).

In *Tripwire*, the primary mission for CPT Holston and his battery is to maintain the stability of Tikuk and more immediately to provide security for a meeting between an Iraqi cabinet member and the local Imam. Through the course of the scenario however, CPT Holston's attention is diverted from this task by the presence of potential IEDs and trying to keep his Soldiers safe. Protecting his Soldiers is especially important for CPT Holston since two of his Soldiers were previously killed by an IED while on route patrol. However, keeping his Soldiers safe may have come at the price of effectively planning for the official's arrival.

Questions to facilitate the discussion of balancing mission and troops begin on page A-4.

### **Learning Objectives**

- Understand the primary mission of the battery.
- Understand how the presence of potential IEDs impacted the primary mission.
- Understand the difficulty in maintaining the balance between mission accomplishment and troop safety.
- Understand how an imbalance between mission and welfare or troops may impact leader and follower attitudes, emotions and behaviors, and the leader-follower relationship.
- Understand how an imbalance between mission and welfare or troops may impact leader and follower attitudes, emotions, and behaviors and the leader-follower relationship.

## 2. *Taking Care of Soldiers*

*[Helping] soldiers cope with personal problems ... means more than referring the soldier to another person – the chaplain, a doctor, or counselor. Until the problem is resolved, you have a soldier with a problem in your unit, so it's your problem...let your soldiers know what you're doing to help them solve their problems.*

FM 22-600-20, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 1980

An issue related to balancing mission and troops involves taking care of Soldiers. A few critical skills and attributes needed by future leaders include caring for Soldiers and demonstrating concern for their Soldier's well-being and off-duty priorities and interests (Tremble & Bergman, 2000). Having the knowledge and ability to effectively help and collaborate with others has been termed *contextual knowledge* and includes such activities as knowing how to calm an upset individual and how to work cooperatively with a diverse group of people (Motowidlo, Borman, & Schmit, 1997). Such activities help to enhance the social and organizational climate (Motowidlo et al., 1997).

The contextual knowledge involved with taking care of Soldiers includes demonstrating respect and concern for others. In particular, empathy involves the ability to adopt another person's frame of reference and, as a result, improves our ability to understand another's point of view (Athos & Gabarro, 1978). Being able to see something from someone's perspective may allow a leader to better care for his Soldiers and their families by understanding their needs and hardships (FM 6-22, HQ DA, 2006). It has been argued that empathy is becoming increasingly important in the use of teams and team work since a team leader must be able to sense and understand the perspective of his team members in order to assess their effectiveness (Goleman, 2005). Furthermore, empathy allows for an understanding of the existence and the importance of cultural and ethnic differences (Goleman, 2005), which may aid in mentoring, coaching, and counseling subordinates (FM 6-22, HQ DA, 2006).

As a leader, taking care of Soldiers also means making sure they are prepared for whatever task the leader asks of them. Therefore, leaders must provide the support, training and equipment needed to carry out those tasks to the maximum extent possible. Likewise, Soldiers will be better prepared when leaders provide realistic, rigorous training and maintain high standards.

Questions to facilitate the discussion of taking care of Soldiers begin on page A-6.

**Learning Objectives**

- Identify the behavioral cues a Soldier may demonstrate when experiencing a personal problem.
- Identify the ways to assist a Soldier with a personal problem.
- Understand how personal problems affect the individual, as well as the unit and mission accomplishment.

### 3. *Directing and Supervising Subordinates*

Directing and supervising subordinates involves a wide range of activities from coordinating individual and team efforts to training and developing subordinates (Carpenter & Wisecarver, 2004). Supervision also requires that a leader establishes criteria and goals for work assignments and ensures assignments are understood (Tremble & Bergman, 2000). However to fully develop Soldiers, leaders need to learn to give subordinates a task, empower them with the authority to carry out the task, and then support their decisions and actions (FM 6-22, HQ DA, 2006; Potter & Rosenbach, 2005). Leaders must not only empower subordinates with the authority needed to accomplish a task, but also provide required resources (such as time, people and equipment) to ensure they can successfully accomplish their mission. This will prepare Soldiers to carry out the task under any circumstances, even in the event they should lose their leader (FM 6-22, HQ DA, 2006).

Leaders who are effective at developing their Soldiers also tend to vary individual's task and duty assignments. For example, cross-training on tasks provides Soldiers the opportunity to learn new skill sets while maintaining interest in routine day-to-day activities (FM 6-22, HQ DA, 2006). In addition, feedback from coaching and mentoring can help subordinates identify areas requiring further training and development (FM 6-22, HQ DA, 2006). Interested readers can find more information regarding mentoring and the Army Mentorship Handbook at <http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/mrc.asp>.

In the *Tripwire* scenario, it is unclear how much effort CPT Holston invested in supervising and developing his Soldiers. In an after action interview available in the AXL.net system, 1SG Morino stated that CPT Holston tended to take things on himself and did not seem to delegate responsibilities. Likewise, 2LT Rojas in his after action interview voiced his unhappiness with always being tasked with quick reaction force (QRF). Lastly, some of the confusion surrounding what to do after CPT Holston passed out is a clue that CPT Holston did not ensure that Soldiers understood his intent and provided enough direction.

Questions to facilitate the discussion of directing and supervising subordinates begin on page A-8.

#### **Learning Objectives**

- Understand how to effectively coordinate a subordinate's activities.
- Understand how to effectively encourage initiative from one's subordinates.

#### 4. *Establishing Trust*

*One of the leader's continuing goals is to build trust and one way to do that is to demonstrate that you are willing to place trust in someone else.*

Lieutenant General William 'Gus' Pagonis

In *Tripwire*, one of the more subtle issues confronting Delta Battery concerns the degree of trust that exists between CPT Holston and his Soldiers. Trust between individuals may be established in a variety of ways. *Person-based trust* emerges from interactions with a particular person. Specifically, person-based trust develops over time as we form expectations of how the person may behave in different situations (Kramer, 1999). *Category-based trust* is bestowed onto a person as a result of their membership to a particular group that we already trust and may be used when there is limited time to determine trustworthiness (Kramer, 1999).

Person-based trust may take longer to evolve since it is based on continuous interactions, specific incidents, problems and events that occur over time between a leader and his or her subordinates (Athos & Gabarro, 1978). The establishment of trust is viewed as a very dynamic, fluid process in which a leader's trust in their subordinates actually fuels a subordinate's trust in the leader (Brower, Schoorman, & Tan, 2000). Specifically, leaders can demonstrate trust in their Soldiers by engaging in actions such as actively listening to ideas, receiving and providing feedback (Sashkin & Rosenbach, 2005) and delegating power and responsibilities (Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Marshall, 2005). In response, the amount of trust team members place in their leader has been shown to be strongly influenced by how much the leader consults and involves the team members in the decision making process (Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995).

In addition to the actions listed above, there are also three general characteristics people use to evaluate the trustworthiness of an individual. These three characteristics are the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the individual (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). When assessing the trustworthiness of a person, we often judge whether or not the person has a particular ability, competence or knowledge in a given domain. Our belief or trust in an individual increases when we know the person has the relevant knowledge and ability to accomplish a specified task (Mayer et al.). Second, we tend to trust individuals who appear to be benevolent or genuinely care about our welfare and well-being (Mayer et al.). Lastly, we tend to confer a greater amount of trust to individuals who adhere to a set of principles, such as fairness and equity, which are similar to our own (Mayer et al.). Interested readers are also encouraged to read the article *Trust: A Critical Factor in Leadership* written by Major Patrick J. Sweeney which can be found online at <https://www.benchworks.army.mil>. The article discusses various strategies for building trust such as demonstrating concern for one's subordinates, demonstrating tactical and technical competence, and empowering subordinates.

It is thought that to be effective, a leader must first gain the trust of his followers (Korsgarrrd et al., 1995). This is especially important in military teams where a leader must rely on trust that his or her Soldiers will carry out his or her intent (Corbett, 2000). There is also evidence that trust produces increased cooperation, higher levels of performance (Adams & Webb, 2003), and enhanced communication (Worley, Bailey, Thompson, Joseph, & Williams, 1999). Furthermore, Creed and Miles state that trust in one's leader becomes increasingly important for effective team functioning in situations where the task solution is complicated and requires a collaborative group effort (as cited in Gillespie & Mann, 2004).

By examining the interactions between CPT Holston and his Soldiers in *Tripwire*, one can infer the degree of trust that existed between the Captain and his men. Arguably, CPT Holston demonstrated very few traits that would deem him trustworthy; CPT Holston did not appear to engage his Soldiers when making decisions, he provided very little feedback to his Soldiers' suggestions, he himself was not receptive to feedback, and he failed to delegate responsibilities.

Questions to facilitate the discussion of establishing trust begin on page A-10.

**Learning Objectives**

- Describe the different types of trust.
- Describe the conditions needed for establishing trust.
- Describe and understand how establishing trust is a reciprocal process
- Understand the impact that trust and mistrust can have on accomplishing a mission.

## 5. *Communication*

A key social skill needed by leaders is the ability to effectively communicate vision, purpose and direction (AR 600-100, HQ, DA, 1993, Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, & Fleishman, 2000). In the future, technological advances will increase the amount of data available to leaders, and effective communication skills will be necessary to extract meaning from this vast amount of information and to ensure a shared understanding of issues and possible resolutions (Horey, Fallesen, Morath, Cronin, Cassella, Franks, Jr., & Smith, 2004).

Effective communication relies on both good speaking skills and good listening skills (Pagonis, 2005). In fact, leaders should routinely ask for and genuinely listen to the input of their subordinates (Pagonis, 2005). When subordinates feel they have been consulted in the decision making process, they will be likely to view the process as more equitable and demonstrate greater commitment to the decision and open communications tend to result in feelings of greater trust for both parties (Korsgaard et al., 1995).

The benefits of active listening include improved understanding and more effective problem solving (Athos & Gabarro, 1978). The following table provides some skills and behaviors to use when actively listening.

### Active Listening

- Take written or mental notes
- Ask clarifying questions
- Attempt to understand the other's viewpoint
- Do not interrupt the speaker
- Do not let anger or differences of opinion prevent you from hearing the entire message
- Do not formulate what you are going to say while the person is still speaking
- Rephrase the person's statement

In addition to content, the leader should pay attention to the urgency and emotionality of the message and watch for nonverbal cues (FM 6-22, HQ DA, 2006).

In *Tripwire*, poor communication exists between CPT Holston and his Soldiers. On several occasions his Soldiers provide suggestions on how things might be done, but CPT Holston himself never actively solicits this input. Furthermore, CPT Holston provides no feedback concerning his Soldier's ideas, nor do their ideas seem to be taken into account in the decision making process. While it is a leader's prerogative as to what advice should be used in making a decision, in this particular scenario the CPT discounted reasonable advice that might have changed the outcome of the scenario. In sum, CPT Holston did not appear to display any of the behaviors of active listening.

Questions to facilitate the discussion of communication begin on page A-13.



**Learning Objectives**

- Understand that effective communication involves providing direction and active listening.
- Understand how effective and ineffective communication can affect a mission.
- Understand how body language can communicate thoughts and emotions.
- Understand the importance of creating shared mental models.

## 6. *Resolving Conflicts and Enhancing Cohesion*

### Conflict Types

- Relationship conflict
- Internal conflict
- Task conflict

In *Tripwire* the members of Delta Battery are faced with a variety of interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts.

*Relationship conflicts* are interpersonal disagreements which arise *between* individuals. Relationship conflicts may occur between two team members, one individual and the entire team, several team members, and between different teams (Schermerhorn, Hunt, & Osborn, 2000).

An *internal conflict* is an intrapersonal conflict which may occur when an individual experiences a personal conflict that may or may not be related to the team, but interferes with the person's ability to perform (Schermerhorn et al.). There are also *task conflicts*, which involve disputes over how a task is being completed or carried out (Schermerhorn et al.).

Like many Army leaders, the characters in *Tripwire* are confronted with several of these different conflict types. For example, CPT Holston is conflicted with trying to accomplish the mission while protecting the lives of his Soldiers. Relationship or interpersonal conflict is evident between 1LT Porter and 1SG Morino, while the news of his girlfriend's pregnancy also triggers an internal conflict within 1LT Porter. Lastly, task conflicts arise within the battery while determining what courses of action should be taken to eliminate the potential IED threats. Task conflicts also arise in determining what measures should be taken to maintain the stability of the town.

All of these conflict types can impact unit performance. For example, team performance has been shown to increase when team members are able to compromise and work together and when they rely on and trust one another (Kouzes, 2005). Furthermore, there is evidence that teams with greater interpersonal cohesion interact more with the individuals in their team and demonstrate greater commitment to a task (Zaccaro & Lowe, 2001).

There are a variety of reasons why conflicts occur. Possible sources of conflict include *communication factors*, *personal factors*, and *structural factors* (Varney, 1989). The greatest amount of conflict is thought to be due to poor communication. Communication problems may include poor listening skills, lack of information sharing, and interpretation and perception differences. For example, very often when someone does not understand or agree with what we have said, we tend to simply restate our position instead of trying to listen and identify what points of the message the person does not understand or agree with (Athos & Gabarro, 1978). It is important for leaders to recognize that each person in a team is unique and personal factors can contribute to conflict. Each team member brings to the team their own personal goals, values, and needs. Structural factors of the organization such as turnover rates, levels of participation, and levels of interdependence may also be a source of conflict for team members (Varney, 1989).

The first step in conflict resolution involves helping the individuals explore their own feelings, assumptions, and goals (Athos & Gabarro, 1978). Once individuals can accurately identify the cause of the conflict they may be willing to compromise on a temporary solution. Compromise involves each party giving up something of value to the other and is often used when time is limited (Schermerhorn et al., 2000). However, if time and cost permit, collaboration may be used. Collaboration involves working through the group's differences and arriving at a solution so there is mutual gain by everyone (Schermerhorn et al., 2000). For more information on event counseling and counseling techniques the interested reader is encouraged to read Appendix B (Counseling) of FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*.

Questions to facilitate the discussion of resolving conflicts begin on page A-15.

**Learning Objectives**

- Understand and identify the different types of conflict.
- Understand how conflict can impact the mission.
- Understand and describe the possible causes of conflict.
- Understand the steps one can take to resolve conflict.

## 7. *Cultural Awareness*

Cultural awareness is integral to mission success as the Army engages in a variety of multinational efforts (McFarland, 2005) and as Soldiers at all levels have increased interaction with local populations and civilian agencies (Leonard et al., 2006). Furthermore, Lieutenant General David Petraeus (2006) noted, “cultural awareness is a force multiplier; [and] reflects our recognition that knowledge of the cultural terrain can be as important as, and sometimes even more important than, knowledge of the geographical terrain”. There is a growing understanding in the military that knowledge of the local culture is fundamental in counterinsurgency operations (McFate, 2005).

Cultural awareness is the understanding of another ethnic group or culture. Such awareness provides knowledge of cultural elements like religion, language, customs, behaviors, thoughts, and perceptions that exist for a group of people (McFarland, 2005). It has been suggested that cultural awareness basic training should include information of these cultural elements and values, as well as how these elements may influence mission accomplishment (McFarland, 2005)

Related to the issue of cultural awareness is that of ethnocentricity. Ethnocentricity is the assumption that individuals with different cultural backgrounds share the same beliefs and motivations as we do and demonstrate similar behavioral patterns to us (McFate, 2005). As a result, we often mistakenly try to understand other cultures by incorporating what we know about ourselves (McFarland, 2005). Ethnocentrism therefore has serious implications for mission planning and accomplishment since it may result in the erroneous belief that our enemies will behave as we would (McFate, 2005). Cultural awareness, therefore, includes both self-awareness of our own values and behaviors and the awareness of how our beliefs influence our opinions of other cultures (McFarland, 2005).

In *Tripwire*, the Soldiers of Delta Battery are in a situation in which the local population’s religion, language, and beliefs influence the mission. In the opening scene, CPT Holston orders his Soldiers to shoot a book bag that possibly contains an IED but which the bag’s owner insists contains a Qur’an, a Muslim religious scripture. Unfortunately, the bag does contain a Qur’an and not an IED. The lack of respect demonstrated by the Soldiers for their sacred artifacts is seen negatively by the local populace. Furthermore, this lack of sensitivity is possibly amplified when CPT Holston is faced with a second potential IED. The second possible IED is in the body of a dead dog, which CPT Holston decides *not* to shoot. This inaction may possibly fuel the population’s dislike for the Soldiers since it demonstrates that American forces are willing to damage a sacred book but not a dead animal.

Another aspect of *Tripwire* is that the Soldiers are reliant on an interpreter to communicate with the civilians of Tikuk. Though often necessary, the use of interpreters is believed to have several disadvantages. First, a lack of language capability may lead to a deficiency of critical intelligence information and local linguistic contractors range in quality and must be highly supervised (Porter, 2006). Second, the argument has been

made that in order to truly know our enemy we must be proficient in their language (Porter, 2006). To counter these problems, several have suggested basic language instruction for all Soldiers so they have the rudimentary skills to convey simple messages (McFarland, 2005; Scales, 2004). Cultural aspects of nonverbal communication such as facial expressions, gestures, personal distance and seating arrangements also should not be overlooked (McFarland, 2005). Individuals interesting in reading more on cultural awareness as it pertains to Arab and Middle Eastern countries are encourage to read *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries* which was published by the Combat Studies Institute and can be found online at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/CombatStudiesInstitute-CulturalAwareness.pdf>.

Cultural differences may also play a role in the development of trust between individuals. It may be harder for trust to develop among individuals from different ethnic groups because of a lack of shared beliefs and values between the group members (Mayer et al., 1995). This topic is becoming increasingly important as the Army engages in more multinational operations and as the composition of the Army itself becomes more diversified. Therefore, cultural awareness training should involve teaching Soldiers how to establish trust and understanding with foreign populations (Scales, 2004).

Questions to facilitate the discussion of cultural awareness begin on page A-17.

**Learning Objectives**

- Understand and describe the cultural factors that may affect a mission.
- Understand and describe how cultural factors can impact accomplishing a mission.
- Understand that individuals from foreign countries may also be aware of US culture and beliefs and the impact this may have on mission accomplishment.

## *Summary*

The preceding teaching objectives and related discussion questions contained in Appendix A are simply meant as a starting point for using the *Tripwire* film in an instructional setting. Instructors should not feel obligated to discuss all of the objectives in a single class period, and we recommend selecting only one or two topics and discussing those in greater detail. Additionally, instructors are free to use *Tripwire* to discuss topics other than the seven teaching topics contained in this manual.

The text version of *Tripwire*, found in Appendix B, can be used by the instructor in constructing course materials and to help remember the timeline of specific events which occurred in the film. The text version can also be given to students to help refresh their memories for events in the film if the discussion continues over several days or if there is a delay between the film's viewing and the start of the discussion. Additionally, the text version could be given to students along with assignments to complete outside of class. It should be noted that the AXL.net system that houses *Tripwire* can be used by instructors to create and administer online assignments.

## **Tips on Leading a Discussion**

### ***Tips on Leading a Discussion***

Discussions are important vehicles for helping students develop an understanding of a concept, topic or problem and may aid in teaching students how to synthesize and evaluate information and opinions. Discussions encourage participants to actively engage in the learning process instead of passively receiving information. Notably, in discussion students learn that the instructor is not the only source of knowledge in the room and can begin to appreciate their peers as having expertise, knowledge or insight in particular areas.

This section is designed to provide help in leading and facilitating a discussion. The topics that will be covered are:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <b><i>1. Establishing the Tone</i></b>     | <b><i>3. Monitoring the Discussion</i></b> |
| <b><i>2. Encouraging Participation</i></b> | <b><i>4. Concluding the Discussion</i></b> |

It is important to remember that a good discussion facilitator will help direct, but not dominate, the discussion. It is recommended that the facilitator allocate 60-90 minutes to show and discuss *Tripwire*. It is also important that the instructor leave enough time in the lesson to establish the tone and ground rules for the discussion. The following table is provided as a quick reference for the tips and suggestions detailed in the subsequent pages.



## ***Quick Reference – Guidance on Leading a Discussion***

### ***1. Tips for Establishing the Tone***

- Get to know students and let students get to know each other
- Arrange student's desks so they are facing one another
- Be aware of where you sit or stand
- Explain or create ground rules for the discussion

### ***2. Tips for Encouraging Participation***

- Begin with questions everyone can answer and gradually transition to more challenging questions
- Be sure to allow time for students to respond
- Positively reinforce participation

### ***3. Tips for Monitoring the Discussion***

- Preserve relevancy of the discussion content
- Maintain order and enforce ground rules
- Determine how you want to initiate participation
- Keep track of time
- Positively reinforce participation

### ***4. Tips for Concluding the Discussion***

- Keep track of time
- Highlight important aspects of the discussion
- Discuss any assignments that are to be completed
- Thank the class for their participation

## **1. *Establishing the Tone***

Students will feel more comfortable participating in the discussion once they are familiar with each other. Allow a little time to let your students get to know one another. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this. For instance, each student could introduce themselves and describe their background to the entire class. If limited time is available, have students introduce themselves to the person sitting directly on either side of them. Also, be sure to introduce yourself. To help the students and you remember everyone's name, you may want to provide paper and bold felt-tip pens so students can create name cards to place on their desks. Most importantly, be sure that *you* learn their names and call on individuals by name.

Individuals are more likely to participate in discussion when they can see each other. Therefore, if possible, move their chairs or desks into a circle, semi-circle or square so that the students are facing one another and make sure that everyone is included within that space. Be aware of where you sit or stand in relation to the students. For example, if the group is only meeting once or if the desks are positioned in rows, you may want to remain standing and move to different positions around the group. If the group is meeting multiple times, vary where you sit within the group since this will help to encourage participation. We tend to develop a rapport with those we are physically closest to. Additionally, sitting close to disruptive students may help to control disturbances.

Lastly, explain to the class what behaviors are appropriate and inappropriate for group discussions by establishing ground rules. You could determine the rules beforehand or discuss the issue with the class and create the ground rules together.

**Ground Rules** you may want to include are:

- **Treat each person with respect**
- **Ensure that all agree that “rank is not in the room”**
- **Everyone should listen respectfully to others (even if they disagree)**
- **Only one person speaks at a time**
- **Everyone participates**
- **Differing opinions are welcome**
- **It is all right to have differing opinions, but disagree with the person's ideas — not the person**

### **Tips for Establishing the Tone**

- **Get to know students and let students get to know each other**
- **Arrange students' desks so they are facing one another**
- **Be aware of where you sit or stand**
- **Explain or create ground rules for the discussion**

## 2. *Encouraging Participation*

To help build confidence and to encourage full participation, it may be beneficial to begin with questions that everyone can answer, such as with a verbal yes or no or with a show of hands. You can then increase the number of open-ended questions to encourage others to speak and to deemphasize your own role. When asking questions be aware that it takes students time to process your question and also to form their answer. Pause at least ten seconds before calling on someone. In addition, remember that you do not need to be the next person to speak after a student's comment, so again wait ten seconds to see if another student will provide a follow-up comment. This could also be accomplished by simply asking the group, "Does anyone have anything to add to what John said?", "What does everyone else think?", or "Does anyone disagree or agree?"

Some individuals may not participate because they feel anxious about giving an incorrect answer. Instructors can try several things to encourage participation from shy or anxious students. For instance, ask the student if there is anything they would like to add or change about a previous comment, ask for evidence or an example of the concept being discussed, or ask them *how they feel* about a certain topic instead of specific pieces of fact or knowledge. Also, if you know a student has specific knowledge or expertise in an area, ask the student to share that knowledge with the class. Additionally, allowing students time to write down an answer in or outside of class and then report back to the group may be helpful for a truly shy student. Doing so will allow them time to formulate their answer and they can simply read what they wrote when they return to class. Lastly, be sure to look around the room and watch for nonverbal signs of readiness to speak. Such nonverbal signs include leaning forward during discussion, head nodding and head shaking, and beginning a side conversation with another student. Occasionally, students also will roll their eyes at a comment that someone made. Instructors can call on this student to bring a divergent opinion into the discussion. However, instructors have to carefully apply their judgment as to whether to call on a student who is rolling his or her eyes because the student could offer destructive comments that may derail the discussion.

Most importantly, be sure to validate student's opinions and positively reinforce their participation. This can be done by either passive or active responding. Passive responding includes providing facial and body cues (e.g., nodding one's head, smiling) or writing down points on the board. Active responding includes *listening and reflecting* on what is heard and incorporating those ideas into the conversation. For example, you may repeat or paraphrase the student's comment, build on the ideas expressed with your own thoughts, and use follow-up questions or statements to encourage clarification (e.g., How does \_\_\_\_ apply to John's comment?).

### **Tips for Encouraging Participation**

- **Begin with questions everyone can answer and gradually transition to more challenging questions**
- **Be sure to allow time for students to respond**
- **Positively reinforce participation**

### 3. *Monitoring the Discussion*

Your job as the facilitator is to make sure the learning objectives are being met by ensuring the relevancy of the discussion content. Therefore, you should prepare a list of objectives and then explain to the students what the objectives are at class time. Doing so will help to focus the student's attention on the issues or problems to be discussed. If your group has had little exposure to the issues beforehand, then be sure to clarify any terms or concepts to ensure everyone has a common understanding and knowledge base.

If conflicts or arguments arise, then you will need to maintain order and enforce the ground rules. Make sure that the group realizes that disagreement is all right and the issues under discussion may have no true right or wrong answers. Place emphasis on the fact that all we may be able to do is to generate several possible courses of action without determining the definitive "correct" solution.

Also, before meeting decide how you are going to initiate student participation. There are a variety of approaches depending on how inclusive you wish to be. If you wish everyone to participate no matter what, then you could simply go around the circle and have everyone provide a comment. While this method guarantees everyone's participation, it may require a lot of time. Further, you could break the class up into pairs or small groups of 4 to 8 individuals and have these smaller groups discuss the issues and then have them report back to the larger group. Breaking the class into smaller groups will also enable the students to get to know the individuals within their group. Make sure you are keeping track of time to ensure that enough time is spent on the issues you wish to discuss and everyone has enough time to share their thoughts. In general, a minimum of 60-90 is required to adequately discuss *Tripwire*. Most importantly, remember to reinforce participation.

#### **Tips for Monitoring the Discussion**

- **Preserve relevancy of the discussion content**
- **Maintain order and enforce the ground rules**
- **Determine how you want to initiate participation**
- **Keep track of time**
- **Positively reinforce participation**

### 4. *Concluding the Discussion*

Be sure to keep track of time so you can adequately explain any assignments and provide some concluding remarks. For example, you may want to highlight the good points of the discussion or any lessons learned and thank the group for their participation. Some instructors may also give their students five minutes at the end of class to write down any remaining comments or questions they have regarding the discussion and then collect these as the students leave.

If the discussion is included in part of an ongoing class, you could ask the student to write a position paper that develops a point of the discussion. You might also have students reflect on the issues that were discussed and ask them to keep track of their thoughts, reactions, and questions to the discussion in a private journal.

**Tips for Concluding the Discussion**

- **Keep track of time**
- **Highlight important aspects of the discussion**
- **Discuss any assignments that are to be completed**
- **Thank the class for their participation**

Remember, these are merely guidelines. You will be the best judge as to how best to implement discussions within your class. One other strategy is to think back to an instructor that you believe was a good discussion facilitator and determine what made him or her effective. Additionally, you could visit another instructor's classroom to observe what techniques they use.

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## **Appendix A**

### **Discussion Questions**



## *General Discussion Questions*

1. As you watched the *Tripwire* scenario, what stood out most to you?
2. If you were the Company Commander in this situation, what would you be most concerned about?
  - What aspects of leadership were important for this situation?
  - What aspects of this situation should the Company Commander have been most concerned about?
  - What cultural issues were most important in this film?
3. Did you observe any good examples of leadership in this scenario, and if so, what were they?
4. Did you observe any failures in leadership, and if so, what were they?
5. What would you have done differently if you were CPT Holston in this situation?
6. What would you have done differently if you were 1LT Porter, the XO?
7. What would you have done differently if you were 1SG Morino?
8. How is the situation in *Tripwire* similar to or different from a situation that you encountered while deployed?

## *Balancing Mission and Troops*

### **Learning Objectives**

- Understand the primary mission of the battery.
- Understand how the presence of potential IEDs impacted the primary mission.
- Understand the difficulty in maintaining the balance between mission accomplishment and troop safety.

1. What was the battery's primary mission?
2. What did CPT Holston believe the mission was?
3. What did CPT Holston communicate as his intent?
  - Do you think the Soldiers agreed with him? Why or why not?
4. In addition to the mission, what other concerns or priorities did CPT Holston have? How do you know?
5. Did the presence of potential IEDs affect accomplishing the primary mission?
  - Did the presence of potential IEDs affect CPT Holston's priorities?
6. Do you believe that CPT Holston was overly protective of his men? Why or why not?
  - Did CPT Holston give more importance to one aspect of the mission over another? How do you know? Provide specific actions of CPT Holston.
7. After CPT Holston passed out is there any evidence that his mission priorities had passed down to his subordinates (1LT Porter)?

*Balancing Mission and Troops continued ...*

8. Do you believe that CPT Holston's priorities impacted the ending of the scenario (the killing of the Iraqi official)? Why or why not?
9. What steps, if any, could have been taken to strengthen the Iraqi official's safety?
10. If you were the Company Commander in this situation, how would you have addressed the potentially conflicting needs of establishing security and protecting your troops?
11. Have you ever been in a situation in which protecting the safety of Soldiers was at odds with accomplishing the mission? How did you balance those two important challenges?
  - Is it possible to over-emphasize the safety of troops in a mission? Why or why not?
  - Reflect on an experience in which troop safety was over-emphasized and the impact this had on the mission.
  - Is it possible to under-emphasize the safety of troops in a mission? What would you do in this situation?
  - Reflect on an experience in which troop safety was under-emphasized and the impact this had on a mission.
12. How can a leader maintain a good balance of mission accomplishment and troop safety?

## *Taking Care of Soldiers*

### **Learning Objectives**

- Identify the behavioral clues a Soldier may demonstrate when experiencing a personal problem.
- Identify the ways to assist a Soldier with a personal problem.
- Understand how personal problems affect not only the individual, but also the unit and mission accomplishment.

1. What does it mean to “take care of your Soldiers” in a deployment situation?
2. Did CPT Holston do a good job at taking care of his Soldiers? Why or why not?
3. What was 1LT Porter’s personal problem?
  - Did 1LT Porter display any behavioral cues that he was under stress or having a personal problem?
4. How did 1LT Porter’s problem impact what happened during the scenario?

### ***Potential issues to follow up on***

- Tuning out CPT Holston during the briefing
  - Striking the interpreter
  - Instances of quick temper
  - Missing the dead dog on the previous patrol
5. If you had been 1LT Porter, what steps would you have taken to work through your problem?
    - Why do you think 1LT Porter did not seek out CPT Holston to talk about his problem?



*Taking Care of Soldiers continued ...*

6. After being told about the girlfriend's pregnancy, how well did 1SG Morino handle the situation with 1LT Porter?
  - What actions should 1SG Morino have taken?
  - Should 1SG Morino have told CPT Holston about 1LT Porter's personal problem? Why or why not?
7. What actions could CPT Holston have taken had he known about 1LT Porter's personal problem?
8. What actions could you take to help a fellow Soldier with a personal problem?
9. What impact did CPT Holston have on his Soldiers by not taking care of himself and letting himself become dehydrated?
10. Describe an experience in which a leader's or Soldier's personal problem affected individual or unit performance.
11. Describe an experience in which the personal problem of an individual was handled appropriately.
  - Why was this approach effective?
  - What was the outcome of this incident?

## *Directing and Supervising Subordinates*

### **Learning Objectives**

- Understand how to effectively coordinate a subordinate's activities.
- Understand how to effectively encourage initiative from one's subordinates.

1. Was CPT Holston effective in coordinating the activities of his Soldiers? Why or why not?
  - What behaviors did CPT Holston demonstrate that were especially effective or ineffective in coordinating the activities of his Soldiers?
  - How did this impact accomplishing the mission?
2. Do you believe that CPT Holston encouraged initiative among his subordinates? Why or why not?
3. What can a leader do to encourage initiative from subordinates?
4. What can a leader do to demonstrate that other's opinions are valued even if they are not acted on?
5. Were there any instances in the film in which CPT Holston actively asked for input or advice from his senior officers?
6. Why should a leader seek out advice from his subordinates?
  - When shouldn't a leader seek out advice from his junior officers?
7. Describe an experience in which input from a subordinate was helpful in accomplishing the mission.
8. What do you believe are some traits, abilities or behaviors of a successful supervisor?

*Directing and Supervising Subordinates continued ...*

9. How well do you think CPT Holston supervised 1LT Porter during the interview of Hazem?
  - Do you believe CPT Holston had control over the situation? Why or why not?
  - What can be inferred from CPT Holston's inaction?
  - If you were in CPT Holston's shoes', what would you have done or said to 1LT Porter after he struck Hazem?
    - What impact do you believe your action would have had on the situation?
10. How effective, in general, was CPT Holston at guiding and supervising the activities of the Soldiers?
11. How effective, in general, was 1LT Porter in directing and supervising activities?
  - Why was 1LT Porter perhaps a little less effective than usual?
12. What conditions in this situation impact the level of direction and supervision that CPT Holston should have been providing?
  - How does a leader know when a subordinate requires more guidance?

## *Establishing Trust*

### **Learning Objectives**

- Describe different sources of trust
- Describe the conditions needed for establishing trust
- Describe and understand how establishing trust is a reciprocal process
- Understand the impact that trust and mistrust can have on accomplishing a mission.

1. How important is trust among Soldiers in a mission like this?
2. What do you believe are the traits or behaviors of a trustworthy leader?
3. Reflect on a situation in which your trust or mistrust of an individual changed over time? What caused it to change?
4. Did you see any examples of trust or mistrust between Soldiers?
5. Evaluate the level of trust between CPT Holston and his Soldiers.
  - What evidence in the film indicates the Soldiers trusted CPT Holston?
  - What evidence in the film indicates the Soldiers did not trust CPT Holston?
  - Think back to the discussion that CPT Holston was having with his Soldiers after the first interpreter was killed. Did you notice any potential trust issues there?
6. How did the level of trust between CPT Holston and his Soldiers impact communication?
7. What actions, if any, did CPT Holston take to establish trust with his Soldiers?
  - If you were CPT Holston, how would you establish trust with your Soldiers?
8. Do you believe that the Soldiers should have simply trusted CPT Holston in this situation because his "methods had worked before? Why or why not?

*Establishing Trust continued ...*

9. How did CPT Holston try to establish credibility with his subordinates?
10. Do you believe the unit found CPT Holston to be a credible leader? Why or why not?
11. Do you believe that CPT Holston's lack of self-maintenance and dehydration impacted his credibility? Why or why not?
12. What actions or behaviors make one credible?
13. If a leader is viewed as credible should he or she automatically be trusted? Do they automatically gain respect? Why or why not?
  - Explain the relationship between establishing credibility and being trusted.
  - Would you have trusted CPT Holston?
14. To what extent did trust exist among other Soldiers in the scenario (e.g., 1SG Morino and 1LT Porter, 2LT Lipton and 1LT Porter)?
  - How did this impact the scenario?
  - Provide an example of mistrust among the Soldiers.
15. What can a Soldier do to build trust with his peers?
16. How can a leader help to build trust and cooperation among his Soldiers?
17. Describe a time when trust among individuals in your unit affected the outcome of a mission.
18. Describe a time when mistrust among individuals in your unit affected a mission.
19. How did CPT Holston choose to establish trust with the local population?
  - Was this effective? Why or why not?
  - What else could have been done to establish trust with the local population?

*Establishing Trust continued ...*

20. Describe an experience that you had trying to “win the hearts and minds” of a population.
  - Were you successful?
  - Would you do anything differently?
21. What actions or evidence from the film indicate that the officers trusted Hazem? What factors possibly led the Soldiers to trust Hazem too quickly?
22. Discuss why the officers should not have trusted Hazem so quickly and the impact it had on the mission.
23. Describe an experience in which you worked with an interpreter. How did you determine whether that interpreter deserved your trust?
  - How did trust define the boundaries of your relationship with that interpreter?

## *Communication*

### **Learning Objectives**

- Understand that effective communication involves providing direction and active listening.
- Understand how effective and ineffective communication can affect a mission.
- Understand how body language can also communicate thoughts and emotions.

1. Do you think CPT Holston effectively communicated the mission to his Soldiers?
2. Effective communication also involves active listening to what others have to say. Do you believe CPT Holston did a good job listening to his Soldiers? Why or why not?
  - Identify places in the film where CPT Holston failed to listen to his subordinates.
  - Explain the impact you think CPT Holston's failure to listen had on the mission.
3. What cues did CPT Holston provide that indicated he was not actively listening to Soldiers?
4. Describe an experience that you know of when a leader failed to listen to the advice of his junior officers or NCOs.
  - How did that impact the mission?
5. Describe an example of good communication between individuals in the scenario, if any.
  - How did this impact what occurred in the scenario?
6. Identify the factors that contribute to an effective communication.
7. What are some examples of poor communication between individuals in the scenario?
  - How did this impact what occurred in the scenario?
8. Reflect on your experiences with someone you believe was a skilled communicator. What actions or behaviors made them effective?

*Communication continued ...*

9. Were there any instances in which specific Soldiers should have been assertive in communicating information or ideas?
  - What was the impact of not communicating that information?
10. Identify any non-verbal cues 1LT Porter displayed that indicated he may have been under stress or having a personal problem.
11. Identify any non-verbal cues Hazem displayed that contradicted what he was saying and may have indicated his true intentions.



## *Resolving Conflicts*

### **Learning Objectives**

- Understand and identify the different types of conflict.
- Understand how conflict can impact a mission.
- Understand and describe the possible causes of conflict
- Understand the steps one can take to resolve conflict.

1. What are the different types of conflict?
2. What are some possible sources of conflict that Soldiers experience while deployed?
3. How can conflict influence a team's performance?
4. What internal conflict was CPT Holston struggling with?
  - Describe the actions of CPT Holston that indicated he was experiencing internal conflict.
  - How did this conflict impact the mission?
  - How can company commanders deal with the internal struggle of caring for the well-being of Soldiers while placing them in harm's way?
5. What steps could CPT Holston have taken to resolve the conflict?
6. What internal conflict was 1LT Porter struggling with?
  - Describe the actions of 1LT Porter that indicate he was having this conflict.
  - How did this conflict impact the mission?
7. What steps could 1LT Porter have taken to help him resolve the conflict?
  - What steps could other people have taken to help resolve the conflict?

*Resolving Conflicts continued ...*

8. What were signs of conflict between 1LT Porter and 1SG Morino?
  - How did conflict between the XO and the 1SG impact the mission?
  - What could each party have done to minimize the conflict?
9. What other types of conflicts between individuals did you observe and how did these conflicts influence the situation?
10. Describe a situation in which an interpersonal conflict was harmful to your unit.
  - How did this conflict impact performance?
  - How was the situation handled?
  - Could the conflict have been better handled? How?
11. Describe a situation in which an intrapersonal conflict was harmful to your unit.
  - How did this conflict impact performance?
  - How was the situation handled?
  - Could the conflict have been better handled? How?
12. Describe a situation in which a conflict occurred over how a task was being accomplished.
  - How did this conflict impact performance?
  - How was the situation handled?
  - Could the conflict have been better handled? How?
13. Reflect back on someone you believe was a good negotiator. What traits or abilities did this person have?

14. What conflicts were present between the local population and the military?
  - How did this conflict impact performance?
  - How was the situation handled?
  - Could the conflict have been better handled? How?
15. What experience do you have with conflict between the military and the local population?
  - What are your recommendations on resolving conflicts with locals?

## *Cultural Awareness*

### **Learning Objectives**

- Understand and describe the cultural factors that may affect a mission.
- Understand and describe how cultural factors can impact accomplishing a mission.
- Understand that individuals from foreign countries may also be aware of U.S. culture and beliefs and the impact this may have on mission accomplishment.

1. What cultural factors played a role in the outcome of the scenario?
2. How was CPT Holston's approach to dealing with the Iraqis different from the Marine's approach?
  - Which approach was better and why?
3. How effectively did the Soldiers deal with the potential IEDs?
4. Evaluate CPT Holston's decision to shoot the backpack with the possible Qur'an inside. Support your judgment.
  - How else could that situation have been handled?
  - How do you think shooting the Qur'an affected the perceptions of the U.S. Soldiers by the local populace?
  - What would have happened if an explosive device really was in the backpack?
5. Evaluate CPT Holston's decision **not** to shoot the dead dog. Support your judgment.
  - Should he have called EOD?
  - How do you think the decision not to shoot the dead dog affected the perceptions that the locals had of the U.S. Soldiers?
  - May there have been an even stronger negative impact of not shooting the dead dog after shooting the Qur'an?

*Cultural Awareness continued ...*

6. Do you believe the insurgents were setting up “hoax” IEDs?
  - In this situation, what purpose would a fake IED serve?
  - In general, what other reasons might insurgents use fake IEDs in Iraq?
7. What was the primary purpose of the IED in the crate of oranges?
8. Why do you think the first interpreter, Tadr, was killed?
9. CPT Holston’s decision after Tadr was killed was to “spread some cash around” since it is easier to “buy loyalty than to beat it in”. Do you believe this was the correct response? Why or why not?
  - Would CPT Holston’s tactic have been more appropriate in a different culture or situation?
  - What would you have done after the first interpreter was killed?
  - Is it more important to show a sign of force in this situation or to show restraint?
10. What impact did the lack of understanding the local language have on accomplishing the mission?
11. What are the important issues surrounding using an interpreter in Iraqi?
  - What questions or concerns might you have about an Iraqi interpreter who speaks “perfect” English?
  - How reliable/dependable are Iraqi interpreters in general?
  - What are the issues involved with getting an interpreter quickly?
12. How should CPT Holston and 1LT Porter have handled getting a replacement interpreter for Tadr?
  - What mistakes did CPT Holston and 1LT Porter make with the 2<sup>nd</sup> interpreter Hazem?
13. When 1LT Porter struck Hazem, what should CPT Holston have done and why?

*Cultural Awareness continued ...*

14. How appropriate would it have been for CPT Holston to criticize 1LT Porter's actions in front of the interpreter?
  - Do you think Hazem would have viewed this as a show of goodwill or as a sign of weakness?
  - If CPT Holston had criticized the XO, how would that have impacted the XO's ability to work with the local population?
15. Should Soldiers be concerned about how they are perceived by the local population in Iraq?
  - In what ways should they be concerned?
  - In what ways should they not be concerned?
16. Reflect on a situation in which having an understanding of the local culture helped accomplish the mission.

**Appendix B**  
**Text Version of the**  
***Tripwire* Scenario**

# TRIPWIRE

## INTRODUCTION

Hours before a handoff from a Marine company, a MLRS battery conducts patrols in Tikuk, Iraq. IED threats have plagued the battery and suspicions of insurgent activity are high.

## A POSSIBLE IED

A group of armed Soldiers surround a young Iraqi male who appears to be in his early twenties. The man's hands are zip-tied behind his back and his head is forced down on the rock wall in front of them.

"Easy kid," cautions Sergeant (SGT) Nix.

Captain (CPT) Holston, a seasoned and confident officer about thirty-five years old, approaches and asks, "What have we got Sergeant?"

SGT Nix nods toward the other Soldiers and replies, "Wilson and Grober here saw this kid drop a bag on the side of the road. It might be an IED, sir."

Tadr, their interpreter, is also present among the group. He is from Iraq. From his salt-and-peppered beard, he appears to be about fifty years old and wears a suit jacket underneath his camouflaged vest. His black-and-white checkered shumagg is partly hidden by his helmet. Tadr interjects, "Says it's his bag and there are prayer books inside."

"It's a pretty big bag. The kid must be very religious," CPT Holston replies and begins to examine the object through a pair of binoculars.

SGT Nix adds, "Yeah, Tadr and me think the kid saw us and just panicked, sir."

Handing the binoculars to the Soldier next to him, CPT Holston replies matter of factly, "Nah, hit it."

Tadr protests the decision, "There is a Qur'an inside."

Holston curtly replies, "I lost two men to an IED during route protection, it's not going to happen again. Give it a tap dance."



As the Soldiers move to take protection behind the rock wall, Tadr shouts in Arabic to the Iraqis in street. Iraqis scurry to clear the area. Kneeling behind the wall, SGT Nix fires upon the bag. A billowing of paper shreds float into the air. The citizens emerge from their hiding spots and start to investigate the contents of the bag.

*Monologue: CPT Holston, "I'm supposed to keep this place stable but maintaining the peace is like going with a rattlesnake. If you don't watch it, it'll kill you."*

A citizen reaches into the bag and holds up two tattered books for everyone to see. He begins to shout something at the gathering crowd. Members of the crowd start chanting in return.

In response CPT Holston replies, "It's better to apologize then to bury you." He then takes some money out of his pocket and hands some to the interpreter adding, "Tadr, tell the kid we're sorry about the damages, but from now on no more running when he sees us."

Tadr turns to the young Iraqi male and speaks to him in Arabic. When finished, Tadr pats him on the back as the youth begins to walk away. At the same time, another young male Iraqi pulls up on a moped from behind a building. The two young men look knowingly at one another. The individual on the moped then turns, travels through the crowd, and disappears.

*Monologue: CPT Holston, "Our interpreter Tadr was right, the bag wasn't an improvised explosive device. Here in a country where anything could be an IED you have to ask yourself, will it find me or will I find it? The bottom line is that it puts you on edge and makes you deal with the fear of the unknown."*

### **THE MARINES MOVE OUT**

*Monologue: CPT Holston, "With the Marines pulling out we had only four days of relief of position; longer would have been better."*

Two conversing Iraqi men walk side by side under a large stone archway into a courtyard. On the right side of the courtyard sit a HMWWV and a supply truck, on the left parked facing the opposite direction is another HMWWV. CPT Holston and CPT Andruzen, the Marine commander, enter the courtyard from the left and walk around the HMWWV to stand at its passenger side window.

CPT Holston asks jokingly, "You're sure you wanna go?" CPT Andruzen laughs in return.

CPT Holston elaborates, "I mean, I can call and see if we can get your RIPTOA extended."

Smiling, CPT Andruzen says, "Oh ya, that's what I want to do, go a few more days without sleep."

CPT Holston extends his hand for a handshake and proclaims, "Good luck. Owe ya a beer."

CPT Andruzen answers, "Yeah ya do," and shakes CPT Holston's hand. He quietly adds, "Get some sleep, Tim."

CPT Holston watches as CPT Andruzen crosses the courtyard and enters the passenger side of the lead HMWWV. He continues to watch as both vehicles head out.

### **1LT DAVID PORTER GETS SOME BAD NEWS**

The executive officer (XO) First Lieutenant (1LT) Porter, a youthful brunette, is sitting outside by a rock barricade. He takes a lighter and burns a letter he is holding. At that moment First Sergeant (1SG) Morino walks up to him.

1SG Morino jokingly asks, "Hey XO? Ya cold?"

Obviously distracted and annoyed, 1LT Porter looks up at 1SG Morino and replies, "What?"

"You're building a fire," clarifies 1SG Morino.

Looking down at the burning letter, 1LT Porter gruffly states, "My girlfriend just got pregnant." He sarcastically continues, "Since I'm over here, I'm guessing that I'm probably not the father."

1SG Morino laughingly replies, "Sucks right now, but at least she won't drop a Jerry Springer on ya after you're married."

Looking up 1LT Porter retorts "Man, you just don't get it." He quietly adds, "We were serious."

In a more somber tone 1SG Morino announces, "BC is ready to brief. Your head in the game? Here. Not home?"

1LT Porter angrily jumps to feet looks 1SG Morino in the eye and snaps, "I know where my head is, First Sergeant." 1SG Morino says nothing, but turns and leaves while 1LT Porter glares at his back.

## TEAM BRIEFING

1LT Porter walks briskly toward a rough stone building. The one side of the building has a large doorway that is open to the street. Inside is a large room containing several tables and chairs.

"Here ya go," says a Soldier leaving the building while handing 1LT Porter a clipboard. Taking it the 1LT climbs the stairs to enter the room.

Upon entering 1LT Porter walks behind CPT Holston, who is seated at a table. 1LT Porter proceeds to the seat on the Captain's right. 1SG Morino is already sitting and is to the right of 1LT Porter at the head of the table. Directly across from 1LT Porter is Second Lieutenant (2LT) Lipton who is African American and in his early twenties. 1LT Rojas, who is slightly older, is standing at the far left of a side table making coffee. 1LT Rojas wears a moustache that does not meet Army standards.<sup>1</sup>

Glancing over at 1LT Porter CPT Holston inquires, "You got the duty roster?"

After placing the clipboard on the table and sitting down 1LT Porter replies, "Yes, sir." He then asks pointedly, "Why can't Battalion give this to ING? He's *their* guy."

In response CPT Holston firmly states, "Cause they gave it to us." Unsatisfied, 1LT Porter silently looks down at the clipboard on the table in front of him.

1LT Rojas walks across the room with a coffee cup in hand and sits down opposite CPT Holston. CPT Holston looks around at the others at the table and announces, "Ok gentlemen. Bravo Company has punched out. Delta Battery is in command of Tikuk. Now this place is cold and it is settled, and we are going to keep it that way. And we are going to protect our own. Now our visitor Jassim al Balad's arrival is still unknown. He'll be coming either late today or tomorrow, which means that we are going to be here for a bit. XO?"

As though somewhat startled by hearing his title, 1LT Porter quickly looks up from the clipboard and asks, "First platoon?"

"Yo," replies 2LT Lipton, raising his right hand in acknowledgment.

"Task, base security," states 1LT Porter and then adds, "Second platoon."

1LT Rojas replies, "Let me guess, QRF?"

"You got it," replies 1LT Porter.

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<sup>1</sup> The moustache is one of many clues in *Tripwire* that CPT Holston may have somewhat relaxed professional standards. Other signs of relaxed standards in this scenario include non-regulation sunglasses and the challenging tone that Soldiers adopt when addressing CPT Holston.

2LT Lipton turns to CPT Holston and asks, "You gonna do patrols like Bravo did?"

To which CPT Holston replies, "If we need them, XO will assign them."

"Why not just do 'em Captain?" questions 2LT Lipton and adds, "On a couple of rolling T's, show them the firepower."

Nodding, 1LT Rojas states, "I agree with Lipton, Captain. That's what we should be doing."

2LT Lipton further adds, "Keep everything quiet until the visitor leaves. Right?" Lipton then looks to 1LT Porter for his input and says, "Dave ...Dave?"

Clearly not paying attention to the conversation, 1LT Porter again startled looks up from the clipboard and nervously glances around the table before adding, "Something like that."

Trying to reinforce his authority, CPT Holston replies, "Our orders are clear. We maintain stability, which means that we defend, we do not provoke. What the Marines did is not my concern."

"I copy that, but these people only understand strength. I think we need to show it," asserts 1LT Rojas.

To this CPT Holston replies, "I fail to see the advantage of being aggressive when the population is passive."

"Yeah, for now," replies 1LT Rojas.

CPT Holston proclaims, "Right here and now is all I can deal with." Continuing in a tone indicating that he has heard enough of the topic, he announces, "Ok, Medivac frequency is 131, EOD is 211..."

From outside the building, the sound of gunfire and a woman screaming overshadows CPT Holston's voice. In response to the commotion, CPT Holston jumps to his feet. 1LT Porter grabs his weapon and heads for the door. Simultaneously, 1SG Morino, 1LT Rojas and 2LT Lipton duck and quickly move from the table to retrieve their weapons.

## **THE DEATH OF TADR**

*Monologue: CPT Holston, "The killing of our interpreter was a human tragedy, but also meant the battery had just been blinded."*

Tadr is found lying in the street with an apparent gunshot wound to his forehead. A small pool of blood forms on the ground. The group of men from the briefing room and other Soldiers have gathered in the street. The Soldiers look to the rooftops for signs of the assailant. After all seems clear, Soldiers begin directing traffic and asking questions of the citizens present at the time.

"He's dead," notes 1SG Morino.

CPT Holston replies, "There's no follow up. Looks like all they wanted to do was kill Tadr." Glancing over at 1LT Porter on his left he asks, "He'd been having any problems?"

"I don't know," replies 1LT Porter.

1SG Morino interjects, "I'll report this security breach to battalion."

"No, I'll do it. It's gotta be an isolated incident," replies CPT Holston as he moves to the right side of the road and then leans his weapon against the building.

1LT Porter quickly moves to the Captain's side proclaiming angrily, "Call out some moving Ts. Show they can't screw with us!"

Undaunted, CPT Holston replies, "Lipton, get a security report and have someone take care of Tadr." CPT Holston and 1LT Porter have now been joined by 1SG Morino, 2LT Lipton and two other Soldiers.

"You got it," replies 2LT Lipton and he turns to leave.

The remaining group crouches down and watches as CPT Holston begins to draw a map in the loose dirt. CPT Holston states, "All right XO, have an LT organize a patrol. Task, patrol route blue checkpoint twelve to seventeen and then to two zero ..."

The chants of the Iraqi citizens can be heard to be getting louder and louder. Looking in the direction of the citizens, 1SG Morino shouts to the Soldiers in the area, "Maintain security!"

CPT Holston continues, "... purpose, find evidence of IED emplacements along that route."

Exasperated, 1LT Porter argues, "Sir, we have to bring a hammer down on this town if you want to maintain the security—not go chasing IEDs!"

Concurring, 1SG Morino adds, "I've got the Marine's intelligence assessment report with a list of likelies. We could hit their houses, let them know we bite."

Still angry, 1LT Porter continues, "If the locals see we kick ass, we'll prevent any insurgent activity." In a quiet menacing tone he adds, "I'll secure this town for your officials' meeting."

Shaking his head CPT Holston counters, "Or it has the opposite effect and it whips them up. Porter, I see our priorities here as: one, we protect our Soldiers; two, make these officials meeting happen happily; and three, keep this town under control. Do you see them differently? We start slapping everybody, we'll be picking a fight and not stopping one."

Donning his sunglasses 1LT Porter replies, "Yes, sir."

CPT Holston continues, "Draw some cash and spread it around. It's easier to buy loyalty than to beat it in." He turns towards 1SG Morino and adds, "First Sergeant, we're going to need an interpreter."

"I'll call Battalion," replies 1SG Morino.

In a strong authoratative tone CPT Holston replies, "No, I mean now. Organize a patrol and find a local who'll interpret. If we can't talk, we can't do."

"Roger that, sir," responds 1SG Morino.

CPT Holston looks at each of the men surrounding him and says, "Look, my methods have worked before and they will work again. I need you men to trust me on this." When it appears that an agreement has been reached, he concludes, "All right, let's move."

The men then rise and start to move out. When getting up CPT Holston stumbles and almost falls over. 1SG Morino catches his arm and asks, "Are you all right?"

A little unsteadily CPT Holston replies, "Yeah ... I ... I just stood up a little too fast." Adding strength to his voice CPT Holston says, "Get me that interpreter, First Sergeant."

"Roger that," replies 1SG Morino.

As 1SG Morino leaves, CPT Holston takes several deep breaths.

### **INTERVIEWING THE NEW INTREPRETER**

*Monologue: CPT Holston, "It took Top about five hours to find someone who spoke English. The question was which team did he want to play for and why."*

A HMWWV enters a courtyard through a large stone archway. The courtyard is being used as a marketplace, and surrounding its edge are tables lined with rolls of

colorful fabric and baskets filled with fruit and vegetables. The HMWWV pulls to a stop in front of one of the buildings and 1LT Porter and CPT Holston exit the vehicle. An Iraqi male in his 30s wearing a black dish-dash-ah watches the two Soldiers as they enter the building.

1LT Porter and CPT Holston enter a room where a lone Iraqi man sits on a chair. The Iraqi man appears to be in his twenties and is roughly shaven. He is wearing a button down shirt and tan pants and his kaffiyeh is wrapped loosely around his shoulders. Windows facing the front of the building are covered by woven blinds while the doorway is open to the courtyard outside. CPT Holston comes to a stop several feet in front of the man while 1LT Porter stands menacing beside the man.

CPT Holston asks, "What's your name?"

The man replies, "Hazem."

"What do you do for a living Hazem?" questions CPT Holston.

Glancing up nervously at the two Soldiers, Hazem replies, "I will do this but I need to be safe."

1LT Porter angrily kicks the chair and barks, "Answer the question!"

In response Hazem cowers for a moment and lowers his eyes, "Fly airplane." Overcoming some of his fear Hazem looks at the Soldiers and sarcastically adds, "But now we have no more airplanes."

"Where did you learn English? You Baathist?" queries CPT Holston.

Hazem defensively replies, "I hate Saddam."

1LT Porter asks, "What bayt?"

In a pleading tone Hazem adds, "Please, I need money for my family."

1LT Porter forcibly slaps Hazem and snaps, "Answer the damn question!"

Hazem replies, "Abu Nimr."

"How many men in your family?" asks CPT Holston.

Looking only at CPT Holston now, Hazem nervously states, "Me, just me." and then pleads, "Please I need money for my family. I have wife, I have children ..."

CPT Holston responds, "Twenty US dollars a day. I want you to set up a meeting with the local power structure. Do you understand what I am saying?"

“Yes,” replies Hazem.

CPT Holston explains, “Jassim al Balad is coming here. Have you heard of him?”

Hazem shakes his head in disagreement and replies, “No.”

From the doorway 1SG Morino states, “BC we’ve got something on route blue.”

CPT Holston glances at 1LT Porter and announces, “He’ll do.” Before leaving he adds to Hazem, “Stay here until we need you.”

The two Soldiers leave Hazem unattended and enter the courtyard. The young male on the moped who witnessed the backpack incident then drives up to the side of the building. He stops and removes a cell phone from his front shirt pocket and tosses it through a side window. He then drives away. Inside the room, Hazem quickly picks up the phone, places it in his front shirt pocket underneath his kaffiyeh, and glances anxiously at the open doorway.

### **ANOTHER POSSIBLE IED**

As CPT Holston, 1LT Porter and 1SG Morino walk up to a group of Soldiers in the street, 2LT Lipton is looking at something down the sandy road through the scope of his weapon.

1LT Porter takes off his sunglasses and peers down the street. 2LT Lipton looks over at CPT Holston and says, “Right there, Captain. IED, right?”

*Monologue: CPT Holston, “IEDs work when they look normal for the countryside. The one that killed two of my Soldiers was hidden underneath a rusted out bicycle.”*

CPT Holston lifts his weapon and examines the body of a dead dog through his scope. Lowering the weapon CPT Holston turns to 1LT Porter and asks, “This been here since your last route clearance?”

1LT Porter glances over at 2LT Lipton and sarcastically replies, “Well, I don’t remember being told about it.” He then angrily orders, “Sergeant, call Battalion for an EOD.”

Interjecting, CPT Holston says, “If, **IF** it’s an IED. This means we’d have to lock this place down for six hours waiting for EOD to arrive and resolve.”

“Which means our visitor can’t pass through,” 1SG Morino concludes.

“Shoot it,” 1LT Porter announces curtly.



CPT Holston raises his weapon to study the animal again. Several citizens are also starting to gather around the dead animal.

2LT Lipton incredulously states, "If it doesn't blow up, we look like paranoid idiots."

Turning on Lipton, 1LT Porter questions, "So what? What do I care?"

Lowering his weapon CPT Holston replies, "Nah, I feel like I'm being baited."

1SG Morino adds, "Someone killed Tadr. Maybe it was a feud, maybe it was an insurgent. Either way, we've got to be assertive."

CPT Holston decisively replies, "Look, we were tested and our response was calm and measured. And they haven't come back at us. Now I know if we talk to these locals instead of scaring the crap out of them, then we will get good will back and everything will stay quiet."

"So what do you want us to do, sir?" 1LT Porter questions pointedly.

CPT Holston doggedly replies, "This garrison has been on high alert since Tadr. There is no way a bad guy could have rigged an IED without us spotting it, which means it was there on your last patrol and *you* missed it. XO, go get our interpreter. Have him tell those Iraqis to disassemble." While turning to leave CPT Holston states, "I'm gonna call Battalion."

1LT Porter utters, "Move out men," while putting on his sunglasses.

The young Iraqi male whose bag of prayer books was shot earlier stands on the street and intently watches the Soldiers leave. He then turns and looks down the road at the dead animal.

### **THE LOSS OF CPT HOLSTON**

1SG Morino enters the building where they left Hazem. He is carrying a helmet and camouflaged vest for the new interpreter. 1SG Morino hands the items to Hazem and says, "Come with me. Move! Let's go!"

Hazem nervously holds the items to his chest as he rises from the chair.

Later Hazem has put on the helmet and vest and his kaffiyeh now partly covers his face to conceal his identity. Hazem is between 1LT Porter and 1SG Morino as the three men walk down the road toward the dog carcass and a group of older Iraqi men.

1LT Porter asks Hazem, "You know those men?"

Hazem replies, "Most of them. They are looking for work. They were promised jobs."

Raising his voice 1LT Porter adds, "Tell them to get the hell out of here or I will consider them hostile."

"No," protests Hazem putting his arms out in front of the two Soldiers. He starts to motion and shout in Arabic to the group of men, who in response yell back and disgruntledly begin to disperse.

As the three men turn back up the street 1LT Porter asks Hazem, "Who is Imam?"

Hazem answers, "Muhammad al Tikuk."

1LT Porter adds, "They're planning on having some meeting. Some cabinet guy wants to meet with him."

"When?" asks Hazem, glancing quickly at the First Lieutenant.

1LT Porter replies, "Tonight or early tomorrow morning. Captain will let you know."

CPT Holston has made his way back to the HMWWV and approaches the vehicle. He is holding his throat. He stops by the passenger side window and leans his weapon against the door. Resting his arms on the open window he notices his right hand is shaking. Ignoring this, CPT Holston reaches in with his left and grabs the MSRT.

Speaking into the MSRT, CPT Holston says, "Phantom, this is Rock 6. Do you have an ETA on that Iraqi official?"

*A voice over the speaker responds, "Rock 6, this is Phantom 3. We are not in contact with him at this time. ETA for you is 1630. Over."*

"1630?" repeats CPT Holston. The Captain returns the MSRT to inside the truck and walks toward the hood of the vehicle. At this time 1LT Porter and Hazem also arrive, and 1LT Porter leans his weapon against the front of the HMWWV while Hazem stands within earshot a few steps back.

CPT Holston states to 1LT Porter, "That's twenty-three minutes from now." While leaning on the vehicle, CPT Holston points to a map laid across the hood and says, "All right, al Balad must be on route red. That means we can link up with him at checkpoint two zero. You did assign a patrol there, right?"

"Yes, sir," replies 1LT Porter.

CPT Holston further explains, "Ok, at two zero we can take him to the mosque and can meet the Imam there."

1SG Morino arrives stating, "Sir, you're not going to believe this. I think we have another potential IED."

"What?" asks an astounded CPT Holston.

"Near route 17. Nix is standing by," explains 1SG Morino.

CPT Holston turns to 1LT Porter and says, "All right, now I'm getting mad. Are you paying attention or are you just ..." Before CPT Holston can finish, he leans forward and collapses. He is caught and helped to the ground by 1SG Morino and 1LT Porter.

"Get a medic!" shouts 1SG Morino. As 1LT Porter runs to the vehicle and grabs the MSRT 2LT Lipton arrives and kneels down beside the unconscious Captain.

1SG Morino adds, "He's not sweating, he's dehydrated," and then shouts back to 1LT Porter, "What do you wanna do?"

1LT Porter responds, "Let's stay with the Captain!"

Not happy with the answer, 1SG Morino shouts back, "Come on, XO! What do you want us to do about the IED?"

2LT Lipton interjects, "Call Battalion. Have them tell the Iraqi guy not to come."

"Battalion's not talking to him," explains 1SG Morino.

Still at the vehicle 1LT Porter shouts, "Look, follow the Captain's plan! Second platoon take route protection!"

"Who's gonna handle QRF?" questions 1SG Morino.

*A voice over the speaker asks, "What is your ETA? Over."*

1LT Porter responds, "Stand by, we're on our way."

At this point, Hazem turns and faces away from the group and pulls the cell phone out of his pocket. He presses several numbers on the key pad and puts the phone back in his pocket. Somewhere else in the city, the young male on the moped gets a message over his phone. He looks at it, nods, puts the phone in his shirt pocket and drives away. As he drives away, a burnt-out van with a crate of oranges laying by the front bumper comes into view.

1LT Porter hangs up the MSRT and rejoins 1SG Morino and 2LT Lipton at the Captain's side. Looking back and forth between them, 1LT Porter excitedly orders, "Look, tell Rojas what's going on. Give the Battalion some way we can talk to this guy. All right, mount a section, do a presence patrol, show guns. All right?! Show 'em that we're ready if they want to engage us."

"Yes, sir," responds 2LT Lipton.

Jumping to his feet 1LT Porter shouts "All right let's go! Gentlemen, get this guy off the street!" Several other Soldiers come and carry off the Captain.

Already on his feet, 1SG Morino grabs Hazem by the arm and guides him toward the vehicle ordering, "Come on, come on."

"Let's move, let's move!" shouts 1LT Porter.

1SG Morino says to Hazem, "In the truck."

1LT Porter, referring to Hazem, adds, "Get him in the truck." Once in the vehicle 1LT Porter exclaims, "Step on it. Let's move it, let's move it!" 1LT Porter picks up the MSRT and shouts, "Rock 5 to Phantom 6. Rock 5 to Phantom 6. Casualty report. Over."

*A voice replies, "Rock 5 stand by."*

### **THE ARRIVAL OF JASSIM AL BALAD**

Upon entering the outskirts of the city, Jassim al Balad, a well-dressed man in a suit and red shumagg is writing notes into a leather notebook. He is riding in the backseat of a black sedan. He looks up and takes notice of his surroundings as the sedan enters the city through a gate in a chain link fence.

In a more crowded part of the inner city another car has its hood up and steam is rising from the engine compartment. Caught behind the stalled car in the narrow courtyard are the two up-armored HMWWVs of 2LT Lipton's patrol.

A Soldier standing next to the owner of the car says, "Come on get this thing outta here."

"I'm doing the best I can ..." replies the Iraqi.

"Get outta here," retorts the Soldier.

"I'm working as fast as I can," explains the citizen.

The Soldier replies, "You gotta move."

Standing next to the second patrol vehicle 2LT Lipton shouts, "Get this car moving! We gotta keep it moving. What are we doing?"

In response the Soldier shouts to the citizen, "Move, man, move! Get out of here, move!"

"... it's the calibrator ..." explains the citizen.

"I don't care, move it," replies the Soldier.

Moving back to the vehicle's window 2LT Lipton notices a sedan coming up behind them and reaches in and grabs the MSRT. 2LT Lipton asks, "XO?"

"Yeah, Rock 5," answers 1LT Porter.

2LT Lipton replies, "I think that Iraqi guy is here."

### **THE AMBUSH**

The HMWWV containing 1SG Morino, Hazem and 1LT Porter pulls to a stop. 1LT Porter hurries out and stands next to SGT Nix under a cloth awning. About fifty yards away at the base of a hill stands a burnt out Volkswagen van surrounded by tires and other pieces of trash. However, in front of the vehicle sits a crate of fresh oranges, some of which have spilt onto the ground.

SGT Nix points out, "That crate, XO-- we've been watching it for a while."

"Anyone gone near it?" asks 1LT Porter.

Shaking his head, SGT Nix explains, "Well, that's just it. No one's gone for the fruit."

1SG Morino interrupts, "XO, top of the hill."

At the top of the hill is the silhouette of a man who is reaching out with his arm and appears to have something in his hand. As 1LT Porter raises his weapon to look through his scope, an explosion erupts as an IED is detonated at the base of the hill by the crate. The Soldiers quickly take cover, and 1LT Porter begins to fire at the man on the hill. The man lifts up the handlebars of his moped to race away but, in doing so, is shot and falls backward. Seeing this, Hazem turns and runs away down the street.

1LT Porter yells after Hazem, "Hey!" and begins to give chase. 1SG Morino, SGT Nix and the other Soldiers also begin to pursue Hazem down the crowded city street.

“Let’s go! Come on, get him! Don’t shoot, don’t shoot! Come on, come on, let’s go! Come on!” shouts 1SG Morino.

As he is running, Hazem takes off the helmet and tosses it to the ground. After running through a stone arched doorway, Hazem turns left around a corner into a courtyard. The courtyard is the same one that 2LT Lipton, his patrol and the Iraqi official are caught in. As 1LT Porter passes through the doorway, two armed men run out from another corner fifteen feet directly in front of him. 1LT Porter takes aim and shoots down both men as the remaining insurgents begin their ambush. 2LT Lipton takes cover as an insurgent begins firing from a balcony into the courtyard below. The insurgent’s fire wounds one of the Soldiers riding in the turret of the HMWWV.

“On the balcony, on the balcony! Ten o’clock!” yells 1SG Morino.

On a different balcony appears another insurgent, who fires into the courtyard. Still a third insurgent fires from a doorway and wounds another Soldier.

“Man down, man down!” shouts 1SG Morino. As the wounded Soldier is being pulled to safety, 2LT Lipton shoots and kills the insurgent on the balcony and the one in the doorway.

At that time the male with the book bag of prayer books appears on a roof aiming an RPG launcher at the Iraqi official’s car.

1LT Porter shouts in response, “Lipton! RPG on the roof!”

2LT Lipton shoots at the Iraqi with the RPG launcher, and the RPG lands well to the right of its intended target. The explosion from the RPG severely burns one the insurgents in the courtyard and his legs catch on fire. 2LT Lipton continues firing and kills the Iraqi youth on the roof. Another insurgent bursts through a metal gated door and is able to shoot several rounds into the Iraqi official’s vehicle, killing the official before being shot down himself. Quietness descends on the courtyard.

As 1LT Porter and 1SG Morino emerge from behind their cover 1LT Porter orders, “Secure the perimeter.”

“Check the alley over there,” adds 1SG Morino.

1LT Porter walks up to the official’s car. Looking inside the car, 1LT Porter sees that the official has been shot and killed.

**Appendix C**  
**Information Revealed During**  
**the Character Interviews**

## *Appendix C*

### *Information Contained during the Character Interviews*

This section contains information taken from Question and Answer (Q&A) interviews with the characters from the *Tripwire* scenario. Q&A interviews are only available through the AXL.net online system and are not included as part of the film DVD package. In the AXL.net interviews, characters respond to questions relevant to the seven teaching objectives embedded in the film. They have answers to questions such as, “How did you manage trust within the company,” and “Did you feel your input was taken seriously,” and “Do you feel you did a good job prioritizing the issues you faced.” In the AXL.net system students have the opportunity to interview the characters themselves, but if you are using the film without the benefit of AXL.net you may want to “leak” some of this character interview information to the class. Doing so may allow the students to gain a better perspective of the thoughts and feelings of each of the characters.

#### *CPT Holston*



##### *Balancing Mission and Troops*

- In the Q&A session, CPT Holston stated his responsibilities were to maintain the stability of the village of Tikuk and to provide security for the Iraqi official's visit with the local Imam. CPT Holston also believed his subordinates fully knew what his plan of operation was because he clearly explained the OPORDs were to maintain stability. However, CPT Holston further elaborated that, since IEDs were prime killers, his first priority was to protect his men.

##### *Taking Care of Soldiers*

- According to CPT Holston, this was the first time dehydration had ever been a problem for him and this was a result of being too focused on the mission and not enough on himself. In retrospect, he stated that he would have made sure that not only was he hydrated, but his men, as well.
- Had he known, CPT Holston stated he would have spoken with 1LT Porter and told him that there was nothing 1LT Porter could do about it until he was back at base. CPT Holston also believed he fostered an environment in which Soldiers who had problems could talk with him. However, CPT Holston did question whether it was possible to create an environment where someone can come to you with a problem as personal as 1LT Porter's was.

##### *Directing and Supervising Subordinates*

- In the Q&A session, CPT Holston explained he believed SGT Nix and Tadr had already questioned the Iraqi youth about the book bag.



### ***Establishing Trust***

- When asked about his approach to maintaining trust within the company CPT Holston replied that, if a leader's techniques work, an atmosphere of trust is created with the Soldiers and trust does not need to be managed unless it breaks down.

### ***Communication***

- CPT Holston believed he was open to the suggestions of his Soldiers and never told his Soldiers to shut up and do it his way. However, CPT Holston did believe their input to be incorrect and thought the suggestion of using force was uncalled for in this situation. CPT Holston believed that Marine CPT Andruzen gave no indication that the town was becoming unsettled.

### ***Resolving Conflict***

- CPT Holston stated that he did not notice 1LT Porter was under stress and attributed 1LT Porter's aggression as a show of support for 2LT Lipton and 1LT Rojas.

### ***Cultural Awareness***

- In the Q & A interviews, CPT Holston stated that he believed it is easier to pay off the local population later than to spend a lot of time arguing beforehand. Furthermore, he stated if the bag had blown up, then he would have had the bomber.
- CPT Holston stated that he had a good feeling about Hazem during the interview. Hazem belonged to the Abu Nimr tribe which has been an enemy of Saddam. Hazem appeared to be somewhat nervous about working for the U.S. Soldiers.

## ***1LT Porter***

### ***Communication***

- When asked if CPT Holston would have listened to his personal problem, 1LT Porter replied that the Captain was not really into listening but was more into expressing his own thoughts and winning the point. CPT Holston did not strike 1LT Porter as someone interested in dealing with the personal problems of Soldiers. 1LT Porter also commented that CPT Holston never provided any feedback, good or bad, concerning his advice on how to handle the town. After a while, 1LT Porter stopped making suggestions and just started doing what CPT Holston wanted.

### ***Resolving Conflict***

- 1LT Porter admitted that, after being told about his girlfriend's pregnancy, it was all he could think about. The only time it was out of his mind was after the Captain passed out. In terms of influencing his behavior, 1LT Porter confessed that learning about her pregnancy did make him get more "fired" up.

- During the Q&A session, 1LT Porter stated he did not tell CPT Holston about his problem at home because he should have been able to deal with it and he did not want to add to the current situation.
- When asked about his relationship with the First Sergeant, 1LT Porter replied that he thought that 1SG



Morino was a jerk and it was very evident that the First Sergeant wanted a job with Battalion. 1LT Porter further explained he felt he was always competing with the First Sergeant for who was in charge.

### *Cultural Awareness*

- 1LT Porter stated that he would have handled the interview with the new interpreter differently than CPT Holston. 1LT Porter indicated that he had not been given a straight answer by anyone since he had been in Iraq and it seemed like the population only responded to strong actions, Therefore, he would have been more aggressive when interviewing the replacement interpreter.

### *Leadership*

- After the Captain passed out, 1LT Porter stated that he was thrown for a moment and had a difficult time establishing which priorities were most important – was it an IED and whether they could stop the Iraqi official's arrival. Then he realized the leadership was on his shoulders, so he ordered 2LT Lipton to do a presence patrol, contacted Battalion and tried to manage both the IED and the visitor. 1LT Porter stated that after the orange crate blew up his only priority was to get back to his Soldiers since it had to be a decoy to pull them away from the main attack.

## *1SG Morino*



### *Balancing Mission and Troops*

- In the Q&A session, 1SG Morino stated he thought CPT Holston did not properly balance between mission and troops and was overly protective of his men. Furthermore, 1SG Morino added that after the first interpreter was killed they should have mounted presence patrols to let the locals know they had a low tolerance for violence towards them.

### *Communication*

- 1SG Morino stated he had a good relationship with CPT Holston, though he believed the Captain tended to carry everything on his shoulders and did not delegate responsibilities enough. 1SG Morino also indicated the Captain really did not ask for his advice and when he tried to provide input, it was not taken into consideration.

### *Resolving Conflict*

- 1SG Morino stated his relationship with 1LT Porter was lousy and time had gotten Porter where he was, not talent. The 1SG also commented that 1LT Porter seemed insecure and his head always appeared to be somewhere else
- According to 1SG Morino, the personal problem 1LT Porter was having was serious but should not have been debilitating. 1SG Morino admitted that it would be difficult to have something personal like that happen while deployed, but that these things happen. It's 1SG Morino's belief that Soldiers need to make sure that personal problems do not interfere with the job 1SG Morino did not think he needed to voice his concerns about 1LT Porter to the Captain since that would have made the Captain split his focus. Lastly, 1SG Morino did not care if he damaged Porter's feelings by being direct.

### *Cultural Awareness*

- When asked about how he would have dealt with the IEDs, 1SG Morino replied he would have blown them all up. He believed the Captain demonstrated inconsistency by shooting the book bag of Islamic teachings but then refraining from shooting the dead dog. Additionally, he stated that show the local population aggression would foster a sense of respect on the locals' part.

### *Leadership*

- After the Captain collapsed, 1SG Morino tested 1LT Porter to see if he was ready for command. At that time, 1LT Porter seemed to get his feet underneath him and took charge.

### *Hazem*



#### *Directing and Supervising Subordinates*

- Hazem believed that the Captain did not have control of 1LT Porter. When Hazem was asked about his impression of the Soldiers, he stated he thought they were disorganized. After the Captain passed out it seemed as though no one was in charge.
- In addition, Hazem was surprised he was left unsupervised as events unfolded in the town.

#### *Establishing Trust*

- Hazem indicated he was surprised the Soldiers trusted him so quickly and had not asked him more questions. Hazem admitted he had been told the Soldiers would spend a lot of time asking him questions and watching how he responded, but it seemed as though the Captain was more concerned about the potential IEDs than the new interpreter.

#### *Cultural Awareness*

- In the Q&A interview, Hazem revealed that he was aiding the insurgents because they threatened to harm his family. His answer indicates that Hazem was more afraid of the insurgents hurting his family than the Americans finding out that he was aiding the enemy.

#### *General Information*

- In the Q&A Hazem confessed his job was to listen and figure out if the Soldiers were going to investigate the orange crate. If the Soldiers were going to investigate, he was to message that they were coming. At the same time, Hazem was scared that the Americans would find out what he was to do.

### *1LT Rojas*

#### *Directing and Supervising Subordinates*

- 1LT Rojas thought 1LT Porter was a good guy and most of the time was pretty easy to talk to. 1LT Rojas felt 1LT Porter and 1SG Morino often contradicted one another so it was difficult to know what he should be doing. Lastly, while he liked performing QRF, he thought it would be good if 1LT Porter assigned him

something else every once in a while, since some of his Soldiers did not like always being the first through the door.

#### *Communication*

- When asked if he felt the Captain valued his input, 1LT Rojas replied the Captain always listened to what they had to say, though he never did things their way. 1LT Rojas was also frustrated because he felt he never received any feedback about the merit of his ideas and therefore believed his ideas were not taken seriously. He also felt the Captain tried to instill trust but did not seem to build it. Instead, it appeared the Captain used the word trust as “this conversation is over and now we’ll do it my way”.



#### *Cultural Awareness*

- In the Q&A session, 1LT Rojas indicated that the Captain’s plan after the interpreter was killed was not how he would have handled things. Instead, 1LT Rojas believed they should have kicked some doors in to project some attitude.

### *2LT Lipton*



#### *Communication*

- 2LT Lipton felt the Captain listened to their ideas, but indicated he had only been in Iraq for two months and he was going to listen to anyone who would keep him from being killed.

#### *Cultural Awareness*

- In the Q&A session, 2LT Lipton stated how aggressively the Marines were handling things and that this seemed to be the better course of action for dealing with the town. However, he said that CPT Holston’s more restrained approach way made sense, too. Likewise, after the interpreter was killed 1LT Rojas and 1LT Porter really wanted to take a more aggressive stance, but again the Captain’s ideas seemed like a smart move.

### *Leadership*

- Overall, 2LT Lipton believed CPT Holston provided adequate direction and a positive model of command.
- When asked what 2LT Lipton would have done differently if he had been the commanding officer, he commented that he would have shot the dead dog and would have talked to his officers about what he was thinking and gotten their opinions.